This paper estimates a dynamic oligopoly model in order to separately identify the demand-side and cost-side advantages of consolidation in the broadcast television industry. I exploit an exogenous change in regulation that led to significant industry consolidation. Using revenue and ownership data for broadcast stations over the past ten years, I estimate the effect of ownership changes on revenue. I recover costs by examining patterns in ownership changes that are left unexplained by revenue estimation.
Introduction
Deregulation in 1996 and 1999 has led to substantial consolidation in the local broadcast television industry. While the consolidation has provoked considerable controversy, the forces that drive it are poorly understood. This paper exploits the exogenous change in regulation, and estimates a dynamic oligopoly model so as to separately identify the demand-side and supply-side advantages of consolidation. This is the first paper to estimate a model of consolidation in a dynamic, strategic framework.
The rapid consolidation that took place following deregulation suggests that there are competitive advantages to consolidation in the broadcast television industry. Yet the vast majority of consolidation involves stations in different local markets, which are not in direct competition with one another. These markets are often located hundreds of miles apart. Therefore it is not obvious how these firms achieve either market power or economies of scale. How, for instance, does owning an NBC-affiliated station in Hagerstown, Maryland helps Nexstar Broadcasting run its Fox-affiliated station in Fort Wayne, Indiana? 1 It is possible that firms with more stations are at an advantage in negotiations with advertisers if they offer more viewers per contract. However, this only works if firms acquire portfolios of stations that are attractive to advertisers as a group.
If firms are doing this, it should be reflected in higher per-station revenue for larger firms. On the other hand, it is possible that firms are able to centralize operations of stations even though they are located in separate markets, often many miles apart. If firms are doing this, it should be reflected in lower perstation costs for larger firms.
1 While most people think of local stations in terms of their network affiliations, stations are usually owned by another company altogether, such as Nextar Broadcasting. This is discussed in more detail in Section 2 describing the industry.
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The goal of this paper is to estimate the revenue versus cost advantages of consolidation, and to identify the characteristics of a firm's portfolio of stations that enable the firm to enjoy these advantages. I consider the number of stations a firm owns, the population coverage of its stations, the average distance between its stations, the demographic heterogeneity of its viewers, and the network affiliations of its stations. These characteristics are likely to impact the attractiveness of a firm's portfolio of stations to advertisers and/or affect the ability of the firm to centralize operations of its stations.
Revenue and ownership data are available for nearly all broadcast stations since deregulation began. This permits direct observation of how the revenue generated by a firm's stations responds to changes in the firm's portfolio of stations. However, I do not observe cost, so I infer cost from patterns in how firms change their portfolios. Patterns that cannot be explained by revenue opportunities are attributed to cost savings. For example, if firms cluster their stations close together with no discernable effect on revenue, I infer that doing so reduces costs.
This method for recovering costs is complicated by the fact that a firm's portfolio decision is both dynamic and strategic. Because the buying and selling of stations involves significant sunk costs, the effects of this period's purchasing decision will likely persist through future periods. For instance, a firm must consider that the purchase of additional stations this period will increase the number of stations that it can expect to own in all future periods, so the firm must consider the effect of the purchase not only on next period's expected profits but on all future periods' expected profits. In addition, if a firm's revenue is affected by its competitors' characteristics, then a firm will consider how its own purchasing decision will affect its competitors' decisions. Suppose, for example, that a firm hesitates to acquire additional stations even though this would lower 3 per-station costs, because doing so would prompt its competitors to do the same. I want my model to allow for this strategic behavior, so that I do not wrongly attribute it to a lack of cost savings from owning more stations.
In order to take into account both the dynamic and strategic elements of a firm's purchasing decisions, I model the decisions as a dynamic game. I estimate the dynamic game in order to recover costs. Each firm's portfolio of stations is summarized by a vector of characteristics (number of stations, population coverage, distance between stations, heterogeneity of viewers and network affiliations).
In my model, a firm decides each period how to adjust these characteristics of its portfolio; this acts as an approximation of the firm's true decision about which stations to buy and sell. The firm adjusts its vector of portfolio characteristics so as to maximize the present discounted value of its expected stream of profits, basing its decision on its own current vector of portfolio characteristics, as well as those of its competitors.
The broadcast television industry is well-suited for identifying strategic behavior because firms' stations are spread across independent local markets. In a given period, different firms are present in different sets of markets, so the nature of competition that they face varies. This feature of the industry allows me to identify the effects of strategic variables on firms' payoffs, because I observe within-time variation in the values of these strategic variables.
Until recently, it was virtually impossible to estimate dynamic games such as this for computational reasons. However, several authors have recently developed methods for estimating the parameters of a dynamic game that avoid computing the equilibrium even once. I adopt the two-step method proposed by Bajari, Benkard & Levin (2007) because it allows for continuous choice variables.
In the first stage, I use revenue data to estimate the effects of firms' portfolio characteristics on per-station revenue. The second stage examines ownership 4 data to estimate the strategies of firms, that is, how they adjust their portfolio characteristics each period. Given these results, I find the effects that portfolio characteristics must have on per-station costs such that the observed strategies are consistent with profit maximization. The result is a set of estimates of both the revenue and cost effects of consolidation. This paper develops an innovative way to estimate the demand-side and supply-side advantages of consolidation in the absence of cost data. As far as I know, it is the first paper to estimate a model of merger activity in a dynamic, strategic framework. My approach allows me to isolate the relationships of interest in an industry that each year witnesses hundreds of firms considering the purchase or sale of over one thousand stations. I find that there are both cost and revenue advantages to consolidation, but they operate through different mechanisms. Revenue advantages come through greater population coverage, which is probably attractive to advertisers who would like to reach a wider audience for each contract that they negotiate. Cost advantages come through simply owning more stations; firms appear to be able to combine operations of multiple stations so as to cut per-station costs. Cost advantages are greater when a firm's stations' viewers are more demographically homogeneous. If most of a firm's stations have the same network affiliation, the firm's per-station cost is lower, but so is its per-station revenue.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant literature, Section 3 describes the broadcast television industry and Section 4 describes the data that I use. Section 5 describes the dynamic oligopoly model and Section 6 explains my estimation strategy in detail. Section 7 explains my results and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
There is a substantial theoretical literature seeking to understand why some industries initially support many competitors but then undergo significant consolidation or "shake-outs."
2 Some of these studies focus on the evolution of an industry from a highly competitive industry to an oligopoly, while others focus on the features of an industry that characterize its inherent or "natural" level of competitiveness in the long run. Because the broadcast television industry was not allowed to consolidate until the late 1990s, it is impossible to know what its natural evolution would have been. The rapid consolidation that followed deregulation suggests that there are demand-side and/or supply-side features of the industry that make it naturally concentrated rather than highly competitive. This paper takes advantage of a shake-out triggered by the exogenous deregulation in order to identify those features. Shaked & Sutton (1987) develop the idea that certain features of an industry's production technology can lead the industry to be concentrated regardless of the size of demand. Specifically, they look at the relationship between a firm's cost and the quality of its product. My results suggest that this relationship is important in the case of the broadcast television industry. Firms with greater population coverage appear to offer advertisers an inherently higherquality product, suggesting that consolidation changes the relationship between cost and quality for broadcasting firms.
There is relatively little empirical research on mergers and consolidation despite the obvious practical importance of the topic. A persistent problem is the difficulty of identifying the factors that drive consolidation because merger ac-2 These studies include, but are not limited to, Jovanovic (1982) , Shaked & Sutton (1983) , Shaked & Sutton (1987) , Klepper & Grady (1990) , Shaked & Sutton (1990 ), Hopenhayn (1992 , Petrakis & Roy (1999) , Klepper & Simons (2000) , and Klepper (2002) .
6 tivity is endogenous. Event analysis uses the exact timing of the announcement of a merger as a source of exogeneity. Also called event studies, these look at how merger announcements affect the stock market values of the firms affected by the merger, in order to understand the effects of the merger. For instance, Knapp (1990) does an event analysis of the airline industry and concludes that mergers in this industry increase market power.
Other papers make use of exogenous sources of variation in merger activity prompted by changes in regulations. For instance, Paul (2003) and Pesendorfer (2003) both estimate the cost structure of an industry before and after consolidation, making use of revisions to merger guidelines to argue that merger activity was exogenous. Paul looks at the beef-packing industry, while Pesendorfer looks at the paper industry. Both authors conclude that consolidation alters the cost structure of firms. Kim & Singal (1993) In all of these studies, ownership changes are treated as strictly exogenous, and the mechanisms through which they affect market outcomes are left largely unexplained. There is very little empirical work that endogenizes consolidation or firms' merger decisions. An exception is the recent literature that models mergers as matching games between firms. The approach is similar to mine in that it uses merger decisions to make inferences about the parameters of firms' payoff functions or to reveal firms' incentives. Akkus & Hortacsu (2007) 4 See Sorenson (2007) , Fox (2007) and Ho (2007) for other examples of matching game estimation, applied to settings other than mergers.
3 Broadcast Television Industry
Originally, broadcast television stations could only be viewed by those who lived within reach of the station's over-the-air signal.
5 They tended to be locally owned, but as major national networks emerged, the government became concerned that local programming would be dominated by national interests. The FCC put into place a number of restrictions that were meant to encourage local ownership; these are discussed in detail later. Stations were thought to be more able to respond to the needs of the local community if they were not owned by or beholden to national networks.
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The total number of stations in the country is effectively fixed over time be- AT&T, when there seemed to be some consensus among policy-makers that the telecommunications industry was over-regulated. Broadcasting companies argued that they were struggling to compete with cable television and home video, and exerted pressure on the FCC to loosen restrictions on ownership of stations. The 1996 Act removed the limit on the total number of stations that a single entity could own (previously 12) and increased from 25% to 35% the portion of the national population that a single owner's stations could cover.
Further deregulation in 1999 allowed joint ownership of two stations with overlapping coverage 8 (previously disallowed) as long as they were not in the same market, and allowed joint ownership of two stations in the same market (previously disallowed) as long as that left eight independent full-powered commercial stations in the market and neither of these two stations were ranked in the top four in the market in terms of viewing share.
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The industry underwent significant consolidation in the ten years following deregulation. Views on the effects of this consolidation differ dramatically. For instance, the Common Cause Education Fund argues "that profit-driven media conglomerates are investing less in news and information, and that local news in particular is failing to provide viewers with the information they need in order to participate in the democracy." 10 On the other hand, the National Association of
Broadcasters ( For each firm in each year, I construct six variables that describe the firm's 13 Some firms were dropped because their stations did not have enough revenue data to enable me to identify firm fixed effects in the revenue regression. The firms that were dropped are generally the smallest (most often individual owners). Therefore firms choose their portfolio each period so as to maximize the present discounted value of their expected stream of profits as a function of their own normalized index is ( current portfolio characteristics and their competitors' current average portfolio characteristics. This framework takes into account the strategic and dynamic elements of the firm's decision.
Revenue and Cost
Let firms be indexed by i = 1, . . . , I and years be indexed by t = 1, . . . , T . A firm's per-station revenue is a reduced-form function of its own and its competitors' portfolio characteristics:
where s it is the vector of i's own portfolio characteristics in period t, s −it is the vector of the average portfolio characteristics among i's direct competitors in period t, µ r i is a firm-specific revenue constant (a firm fixed-effect) and ν it is a demand shock distributed N (0, σ r i ). The parameters to be estimated are r={r 0 , r 1 , r 2 }, µ r i and σ r i . A firm's per-station cost is a reduced-form function of its own portfolio characteristics, subject to adjustment costs:
where s it and s −it are as in the revenue equation, n it is the firm's number of The firm's static profit is:
Strategies and Equilibrium
Let S it be a vector consisting of i's own portfolio characteristics and the averages of its competitors' portfolio characteristics:
Since a firm's static profit depends on its competitors' portfolios only through the average characteristics of its direct competitors s −it , firm i's state in period t can be fully described by the state vector S it . A firm's strategy maps from its state vector this period to the vector of its own portfolio characteristics next period:
The firm chooses σ i to maximize the present discounted value of its expected stream of profits given the strategies of its competitors. This value can be written:
The equilibrium concept is Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium; a firm's strategy depends only on its current state vector. The equilibrium can thus be defined as the strategy σ * that satisfies:
That is, σ * i (s) is the strategy that maximizes the value of state s given σ * −i .
Estimation

Empirical Strategy
The goal of the paper is to estimate the revenue and cost parameter vectors r and c. Because revenue is observed, r can be estimated by regressing perstation revenue on state variables. Costs are not observed, so I estimate the dynamic game in order to recover the cost parameter vector c. I use a two-step method proposed by Bajari, Benkard & Levin (2007) that avoids computing the equilibrium even once and that allows for continuous choice variables. In the first stage, I estimate the strategies governing firms' adjustments of their portfolio characteristics each period. In the second stage, value functions are estimated for the observed strategies and for randomly drawn alternative strategies; then the cost parameters are found that minimize the sum of squared profitable deviations from the observed strategies. These are the cost parameters that "rationalize" the observed strategies given the estimated revenue parameters.
Revenue Estimation
The first step is to estimate the revenue equation ( n it and each of the other characteristics of i's portfolio (except total coverage).
I have a panel of firms, so firm fixed effects are included. The firm-specific standard error of the demand shock σ r i is estimated as the standard error of the regression residual across all of firm i's observations. One complication is that I am eliminating station identity from the model, yet stations are heterogeneous. Failing to take into account station heterogeneity might lead to biased coefficients on portfolio characteristics in the revenue equation, which would in turn lead to biased cost coefficients in the second stage of estimation. This would happen if the revenue potential of a station is correlated with the characteristics of its owner's portfolio which are included in estimation.
19 In order to deal with station heterogeneity, I include as a regressor in the revenue equation the average revenue generated by firm i's period-t stations across all years and owners. This can be thought of as the average revenue potential of i's period-t stations, regardless of ownership. I also include this value in the cost equation, to allow for the (likely) possibility that stations that generate more revenue also cost more to operate.
Inclusion of the average revenue potential of firm i's stations is roughly equivalent to including station fixed effects. I also include firm and year fixed effects. Therefore I am effectively looking at variation within the firm-stationyear. Given this, the most important identification assumption is that there is no trend in a station's revenue which induces a firm with particular portfolio 19 For example, suppose that owning more stations increases revenue with no effect on cost.
But also suppose that firms with more of stations tend to own smaller stations, which generate less revenue and incur less cost. Then the coefficient on n it in the revenue equation will be biased downward. When looking at firm strategies to infer costs, I will be searching for the cost coefficient that explains the firm's tendency to buy up stations despite the (spurious) fact that this does not improve revenue. The cost coefficient on n it will be biased downward as well; it will look like owning more stations lowers costs more than it actually does.
characteristics to purchase it (no reverse causality). Since the timing of station purchases was largely the result of an exogenous change in regulation, this is likely to be a reasonable assumption.
Cost Estimation
Estimation of the cost equation (2) is considerably more complicated. Costs are not observed, so I look at the strategies employed by firms -that is, their portfolio adjustments each period -in order to recover costs. If firms are acting optimally, then the ex ante value of a state for a firm if it follows the observed strategy must be greater than it would be if it followed any other strategy. The goal is to find the cost parameter vector c that makes this true, given the estimated revenue parameter vector r and competitor strategies σ −i . Therefore, in order to recover cost estimates, I must calculate the ex ante value of being at each observed state as a function of σ i , σ −i , r and c. The estimation of cost coefficients proceeds as follows:
1) Estimation of strategies
2) Estimation of the ex ante value of each observed state for the observed strategies and for alternative strategies, as a function of c
3) The search for c that makes the ex ante values of states greater for the observed strategies than for the alternative strategies.
Estimation of Strategies
The functions governing the evolution of i's own portfolio characteristics constitute i's strategy, σ i : S it → s it+1 . The functions governing the evolution of the average portfolio characteristics among i's competitors s −it will act as a Let the variables in the state vector be indexed by j. I want to allow next period's state variable S jit+1 to be a function of all of the variables in the state vector in this period S it . I specify the evolution of S jit as follows:
Recall that the variables in the state vector S it include i's own portfolio characteristics s it as well as the average characteristics among i's competitors' portfolios s −it . Therefore the variable S jit+1 on the left-hand side of (5) can be an element of s it or an element of s −it . The α's in the equations for which an element of s it is the dependent variable together compose σ i , while the α's in the equations for which an element of s −it is the dependent variable together compose σ −i .
In (5), each state variable is subject to a time trend and a firm-specific constant. Estimation of (5) is complicated; I have a dynamic panel data model with endogenous explanatory variables, lagged dependent variables and unobserved firm heterogeneity. In the presence of lagged dependent variables and endogenous regressors, η i cannot be treated as a constant to be estimated. Firstdifferencing removes η i , but the endogeneity problem requires instruments. I use the estimator developed by Arellano & Bond (1991) , which uses higher-order lagged differences of the regressors as instruments. This often suffers from a weak instrument problem. Fortunately the F-statistic is greater than 10 in all of the first-stage regressions but one, when it is just under 10. A bigger problem is that the validity of the instruments requires the assumption of no serial correlation, which is strong in this case.
The following system of equations is estimated using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator:
Equation (6) is estimated only for firms that are already active in the industry (n it−1 > 0). For inactive firms, data are highly skewed, so I estimate P r(S it+1 |n it = 0) non-parametrically. Furthermore, non-parametric estimation is done separately for firms that have not yet entered and firms that have exited because their behavior is quite different (once a firm exits, it rarely re-enters).
Value Function Estimation
The value function can be written:
where the expectation is over shocks to demand (ν), cost (ω) and strategy implementation ( ). State variables are continuous, so I use a method proposed by Bajari, Benkard & Levin (2007) to estimate the value function by simulation.
For a given state S it , a path of play can be simulated by usingσ and a set of shocks drawn from the estimated distribution of ∆ i . I simulate the evolution of the state vector well into the future (100-200 periods), until the discount factor will render sufficiently small the present value of any payoffs generated.
Given a set of parameters r and c and draws of shocks ν and ω, I can calculate 22 the present value of payoffs associated with this path of play. Repeating this procedure numerous (1000-2000) times and averaging the present value of payoffs over all of these paths gives me an estimated ex ante value associated with this state S it .
Search for Cost Estimates
The final step is to search over possible cost parameter vectors to find c * which minimizes the profitable deviations generated by alternative strategies, and therefore makesσ i optimal givenσ −i andr. The simulation of numerous paths of play for each state that is observed in the data (a total of 12 years * 544 owners = 6528 states) is the computationally expensive part of the estimation process. I impose a few restrictions in order to make estimation feasible.
First, I impose the restriction that the firm-specific cost constant µ Another restriction is that I must write the ex ante value of a state as a 23 linear function of the cost parameter vector c:
where: For each state observed in the data, I estimateŴ 1 andŴ 2 under various perturbations of the observed strategies (that is, functions governing the evolution of s it ), keeping competitors' strategies (that is, functions governing the evolution of s −it ) and the revenue coefficient vector r fixed. I then find the cost coefficient vector c * that must exist in order for the observed strategies to be superior to the perturbations. The equilibrium condition (4) can be written:
Let the alternative firm strategies that are considered be indexed by x = 1, . . . , X.
Then let g(S it , x, c) denote the present discounted value of the stream of additional profits that can be expected to result from a deviation to alternative strategy σ i (indexed by x) when starting at state S it and given cost coefficient vector c:
I find c * that minimizes the following objective function:
That is, I find c * that minimizes the sum of squared violations of the equilibrium condition.
Because the industry remains regulated, firms are not free to choose any portfolio that they want. Therefore I restrict the behavior of firms in simulated paths of play. I do not allow firms to acquire more stations than would realistically be allowed under current regulations, or to choose a smaller average distance between stations than would be allowed. Also, I consider very small perturbations of the observed strategies as alternative strategies; these are alternatives that are presumably available to firms. A strategy perturbation consists of an increase or decrease for each portfolio characteristic in each period of 0.5%, 25 1%, 1.5% or 2%, chosen randomly. For a given state, alternative strategy and portfolio characteristic, the same deviation is made in each successive period.
Parameter estimates are not very sensitive to the number of alternative strategies considered. More alternative strategies allows for more precise estimates but this comes at high computational cost. In practice I use X=30.
Empirical Results
Revenue is observed, so the interpretation of revenue estimates is fairly straightforward. The interpretation of cost estimates is more complicated. Cost is essentially a residual, serving to explain the behavior of firms that is left unexplained by revenue. For this reason, it is unreasonable to interpret cost simply as strictly the cash that flows out of a firm in a given year; it may include the cost of raising capital, the cost of being exposed to risk, and so on. This should be kept in mind when interpreting my results.
The equilibrium condition used to recover cost assumes that the present discounted value of the expected stream of revenue from a station minus the present discounted value of the expected stream of cost of a station must be greater than zero in order for a firm to choose to own (rather than sell) the station. In reality, this value must be greater than the market value of the station, because this is what the firm must pay to own the station (or what the firm could earn by selling the station). The annual per-station cost recovered in my estimation therefore includes the annual opportunity cost of holding (not selling) the station at market value.
Suppose that the market for broadcast television stations operates perfectly, with efficient credit markets and all agents having full information. Then we would expect the market value of a station to be approximately equal to the 26 present discounted value of the station's expected stream of profits. Therefore the annual opportunity cost of holding the station would be approximately equal to the annual profit generated by the station. In this case, recovered annual perstation cost would be close to annual per-station revenue.
22 Table 1 presents summary statistics for annual per-station revenue and recovered annual perstation cost for portfolios that are observed in the data over the past ten years.
The distributions of revenue and cost are highly skewed. For this reason, direct comparisons of the mean and median can be hard to interpret. However, the rough equivalence of the maximum per-station revenue and maximum recovered per-station cost shown in Table 1 is consistent with cost estimates that are relatively clean and that include opportunity cost.
It is worth thinking about how inclusion of opportunity cost in recovered cost may affect the estimated coefficients of interest, that is, the effects of a firm's portfolio characteristics on its per-station cost. As long as this opportunity cost is exogenous to the variables of interest, the estimated coefficients should not be biased. The opportunity cost of holding a station should reflect the highest value that any other firm would pay for the station. This value should not be directly affected by the portfolio characteristics of the firm in question. Therefore the coefficients of interest should not be affected.
A final point that should be kept in mind when interpreting my results is that this industry remains regulated. Therefore firms are not completely free to adjust the characteristics of their portfolios of stations. Therefore, the 22 Consider a simple numerical example. A station generates $10 million in annual revenue, and costs $7 million to operate annually; therefore the station's annual profit is $3 million. If the market for this station operates perfectly, with full information, then the opportunity cost of holding the station would be approximately equal to $3 million because this is how much other firms would be willing to pay annually in order to own the station. Therefore the total annual cost of the station is $7 million + $3 million = $10 million.
estimated revenue and cost effects should be interpreted as those that exist under current regulations. They do not tell us what the revenue and cost advantages of consolidation would be under an entirely different set of regulations.
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The estimated revenue coefficientsr and cost coefficientsĉ are shown in Table 2. Note that the adjustment coefficients are effects on the firm's total (not per-station) cost, and that these are one-time effects that are assumed not to persist through time. All of the other estimates are the effects of portfolio characteristics on annual per-station revenue or cost. Preliminary standard errors for cost estimates are calculated using the method described in Pakes, Porter, Ho & Ishii (2006) ; this involves estimating the covariance matrix for the value function, taking draws from the sample distribution of the value function, and minimizing the objective function to find cost estimates for each of these draws.
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Because the units of the portfolio characteristics vary and are not necessarily intuitive, the results are easier to interpret by looking at per-station revenue, most likely because advertisers pay more to reach more viewers per transaction. Given that median per-station revenue is $6 million, this effect is large in magnitude.
A standard deviation change of 5 in Number of Stations owned is associated with a $1.85 million reduction in per-station cost. That is, acquiring more stations gives firms a cost advantage; firms are probably able to combine operations of multiple stations and cut costs. This effect is also quite large in magnitude.
While increasing total coverage boosts per-station revenue, it also increases The average implied annual opportunity cost of holding a station is $18 million.
At an interest rate of 6%, this is consistent with an average station market value of $307 million. Given the highly skewed distribution of revenue and cost in this industry, this is likely to be much greater than the median market value. I do not have data on station sales prices, but anecdotal evidence suggests that this is reasonable.
Conclusion
This paper estimates the demand-side and supply-side advantages of consolidation in the broadcast television industry. The consolidation has provoked considerable controversy. However, the reasons it occurred are not well understood, because firms mainly purchase stations that are not in direct competition with one another and that are located many miles apart.
I exploit an exogenous change in regulation that led to significant consolidation in the industry. Although revenue and ownership data are available for broadcast television stations, cost data are not available. I recover costs by examining patterns in ownership changes that are left unexplained by revenue opportunities. Because the firm's purchasing decision involves dynamic and strategic elements, I model the decision as a dynamic game. The firm adjusts its portfolio characteristics each period so as to maximize the present discounted value of its expected stream of profits. My approach allows me to isolate the relationships of interest in an industry that each year witnesses hundreds of firms considering the purchase or sale of over one thousand stations. As far as I know, this paper is the first to estimate a model of merger activity in a dynamic, 33 strategic framework.
My results suggest that consolidation in this industry offers both revenue and cost advantages, but that they operate through different mechanisms. 
